



DETERMINANTS OF INTERNAL DISPLACED PERSON'S RELOCATION TO ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT IN JERE LGA, 2010-2025

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Abstract

The study examined the factors affecting the relocation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their original settlements in host communities in Jere Local Government Area, Borno State from 2010 to 2025. The specific objectives were to assess the implications of inadequate finances on the reconstruction of the original settlements of IDPs, examine the impact of insecurity on the relocation process, and evaluate the effects of unemployment on the resettlement of IDPs in their original communities. Relevant Literature was reviewed in line with the study objectives. The methodology adopted for this study utilized both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were obtained through interviews, and official documents, while secondary data were sourced from books, journals, and other published materials relevant to the subject matter. All information gathered was critically evaluated and analyzed using the historical approach to ensure accuracy and minimize bias. The findings of the study revealed that inadequate finances remain a major obstacle to the reconstruction of destroyed communities, as insufficient funding, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and corruption continue to impede rebuilding efforts. The study further found that persistent insecurity, including sporadic insurgent attacks and the presence of landmines, has discouraged many IDPs from returning to their original home. In addition, the findings showed that high unemployment among IDPs hinders relocation, as the lack of sustainable livelihoods opportunities in their home communities makes resettlement both unattractive and unsustainable. The study concludes that the relocation of IDPs in Jere Local Government Area is influenced by interconnected factors such as finance, security, and employment, all of which determine the sustainability of return and reintegration.

Keywords: Relocation, Original Settlement, Inadequate finance and unemployment.

1.0 Introduction

Relocation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their original settlement involves the provision of early recovery support, protection, food security, and education. These interventions are critical in the initial stages of reintegration, as they help address immediate needs and anticipate potential bottlenecks or obstacles to essential service. In particular, relocation processes includes advance planning for the rapid reenrolment of returning IDP children into local schools,

ensuring continuity of education and facilitating smoother social reintegration. The organization responsible for the relocation of IDPs provides access to education in a native language and that any educational achievements during displacement are recognized as to help the schools cope with the new arrivals through food or cash-for-work programmes to increase the number of teachers, classroom facilities and improve sanitation. The committee for the relocation of IDPs to their



original settlement strengthens health centres, particularly to attend births, ensure uninterrupted treatment for chronic ill persons, provide emergency assistance, such as treatment for injuries caused by landmines or other unexploded ordnance, and provide psycho-social support¹.

The first step in the relocation process of IDPs to their original settlement is the voluntary confirmation of the settlement by ensuring the establishment of a system in which all adult IDPs sign a form attesting that their movement is voluntary prior to receiving transport assistance by national authorities or the international community. Internally Displaced Persons are also provided with space for individuals or groups to express their views about their chosen solution, particularly for those who do not agree with the view of the majority, including youth who, especially in protracted situations, often prefer to settle locally rather than relocating, as their parents might want. This is particularly important in highly politicized settings, where the issue of available durable solutions can be manipulated and misrepresented by different interest groups². Internally Displaced Persons are given support for the restoration of local civil registries, and destruction of properties relating to the IDPs' civil, legal status and their titles to land. This is critical to facilitate potential reintegration, family reunification, access to public services, and recovery of or compensation for land, housing and property. It also contributes to

the resolution of cases of statelessness³. It is the responsibility of government authorities to provide support in developing and implementing mechanisms for restitution of or compensation for land and property. The study addresses the persistent challenge of many internally displaced persons (IDPs) remaining in host communities within Jere Local Government Area despite government and humanitarian resettlement efforts. While previous studies have primarily focused on challenges such as insecurity, inadequate infrastructure, and limited livelihood opportunities, limited attention has been given to the combined influence of inadequate financial resources, unemployment, psychosocial trauma, cultural integration, and post-relocation experiences on IDPs' resettlement decisions. This study therefore seeks to examine these broader factors in order to provide evidence that can inform more effective and sustainable resettlement strategies. It is against this background that the study assessed the factors affecting the relocation of IDPs to their original settlement within Jere Local Government Area, Borno State.

Factors Affecting -the Relocation Of IDPS In Jere LGA

The relocation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Jere Local Government Area is shaped by several interrelated factors that influence their willingness and ability to return to their original settlements. Since the outbreak of insurgency in parts of Borno State, many communities have suffered destruction of homes, loss of livelihoods, and disruption of basic services, resulting in prolonged displacement. In host communities such as Jere, IDPs often benefit from relatively better security and

¹ Hamza, M. *Health, protection, and education in IDP relocation programmes: Evidence from Northeast Nigeria*. International Journal of Humanitarian Studies, 11(4), 55–70. 2023.

² Eme, O. I., & Ibietan, J. *Politics of displacement and durable solutions in Nigeria: A governance perspective*. Journal of African Policy and Administration, 15(3), 101–118. 2022.

³ Adekoya, T. *Property restitution and reintegration of internally displaced persons in Nigeria: Legal and policy perspectives*. Journal of Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, 14(2), 45–59. 2022.



humanitarian support, which also affects relocation decisions. Key factors include security conditions in areas of origin, availability of infrastructure, access to healthcare and education, livelihood opportunities, and the effectiveness of government and humanitarian reintegration efforts. Together, these determine whether return is safe, feasible, and sustainable.

Inadequate Finances for the Rebuilding Original Settlements of IDPS

The reconstruction of original settlements in post-conflict Jere demands extensive financial commitment, encompassing the rebuilding of housing, roads, schools, clinics, and agricultural infrastructure. However, fiscal limitations at both the state and federal levels have restricted the speed and scale of rehabilitation efforts.

Mr. Ibrahim Musa 50 years old, a displaced farmer from Dusuman interviewed in November 2025, states: *“Government told us they will help us rebuild, but up to now, only a few houses have been touched. Many of us have no money to even buy roofing sheets.”*⁴

This reflects a broader funding gap between official promises and implementation. According to the Borno State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement (MRRR), available funds have primarily been channeled toward pilot resettlement projects in areas with greater accessibility and security, leaving peripheral communities like Gongulong and Mashamari lagging behind.⁵

Limited Access to Credit and Livelihood Capital: The absence of accessible financial services for displaced families compounds

their economic distress. Without collateral or formal income records, many IDPs are excluded from credit facilities and agricultural loans, limiting their ability to restart farming or trading activities.

Mrs. Amina Garba 37 years old, a widow and displaced trader from Muna Camp interviewed in November 2025, this is what she say: *“We depend on what NGOs give us. Even when we try to borrow small money, nobody trusts us because we have no land or business left.”*⁶

This observation mirrors findings by Lawal, who emphasized that access to microfinance plays a pivotal role in reintegrating displaced populations into productive livelihoods.⁷ The absence of such financial inclusivity thus reinforces cycles of poverty and dependency in Jere’s displacement context.

Government Budgetary Constraints: At the state level, Borno’s post-conflict recovery budget has been overstretched across multiple sectors, including security, education, and humanitarian aid. The financial allocation for reconstruction under the State Rehabilitation Plan (2023–2026) remains insufficient to address the full scope of infrastructural decay.

Mr. Mustapha Ali 44 years old, an officer at the Borno State Ministry of Finance interviewed in November 2025, explains: *“Funds are limited. The government depends on federal allocations and donor support, but the needs far exceed what is available.”*⁸

This scarcity of financial resources not only affects physical reconstruction but also

⁴ Interview with Ibrahim Musa, Farmer, Age 50, Dusuman, November 2025.

⁵ Borno State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement (MRRR), Quarterly Progress Report on Post-Conflict Recovery, 2025.

⁶ Interview with Amina Garba, Trader, Age 37, Muna Camp, November 2025.

⁷ Lawal, S. “Socio-Economic Challenges of IDP Reintegration in Northern Nigeria,” *Journal of African Development Studies* 10, no. 3 (2023): 22–36.

⁸ Interview with Mustapha Ali, Finance Officer, Age 44, Maiduguri, November 2025.



slows down compensation programs for lost property, leading to reduced motivation for voluntary return. Studies by Ngwu, Olumide, and Nwachukwu indicate that inadequate budgetary prioritization often delays durable solutions for displaced populations in conflict-affected regions.⁹

Dependence on Humanitarian Aid: Another dimension of financial inadequacy lies in the prolonged dependence on humanitarian assistance. While aid has been essential in sustaining displaced populations, it has inadvertently fostered a dependency mindset among some IDPs. Many respondents expressed fear that returning home might mean losing access to food distributions and stipends provided in camps.

Mr. Hassan Umar 42 years old, displaced mason from Mashamari interviewed in November 2025, observes: *“Here in Jere, we get help from time to time. If we go back home and the help stops, how will we survive? (SIC)”*¹⁰

This concern reflects a humanitarian paradox where short-term relief sustains lives but can discourage long-term self-reliance. According to Ezech, Okoro, and Uchenna, such dependence is particularly prevalent when aid transitions are not paired with economic empowerment programs.¹¹

Donor Fatigue and Limited International Support: International donor support has been vital to Borno State’s recovery efforts since 2016. However, as global humanitarian priorities shift, donor fatigue

has become evident. Several international NGOs have reduced operations or reallocated funding to new crises in Sudan and Gaza, leaving funding gaps in ongoing resettlement programs.

Mrs. Rose Nwachukwu 41 years old, program coordinator with a humanitarian NGO interviewed in November 2025, reports: *“Many donors have scaled down funding. The focus is now on sustainability, but there is little money to support reconstruction directly.”*¹²

This reduction has resulted in unfinished infrastructure projects, stalled housing reconstruction, and delayed livelihood grants in Jere. A report by UNHCR similarly identified diminishing donor interest as a major threat to the long-term success of displacement solutions in northeastern Nigeria.¹³

Inflation and Economic Instability: Economic instability at the national level, characterized by inflation and currency depreciation, has further eroded both governmental and household purchasing power. Rising prices of cement, building materials, and agricultural inputs have made rebuilding prohibitively expensive for displaced families.

Mr. Modu Ibrahim 47 years old, a carpenter from Gongulong interviewed in November 2025, explains that: *“Cement that used to cost ₦4,000 now sells for more than ₦8,000. Even if someone gives you small help, it finishes before you build two walls.”*¹⁴

This aligns with national economic data showing that inflation rates in 2025 surpassed 31%, drastically increasing the

⁹ Ngwu, O., Olumide, T., & Nwachukwu, F. “The Economics of Post-Conflict Recovery in Northeastern Nigeria,” *African Journal of Conflict Transformation* 7, no. 1 (2021): 51–65.

¹⁰ Interview with Hassan Umar, Mason, Age 42, Mashamari, November 2025.

¹¹ Ezech, C., Okoro, P., & Uchenna, N. “Substance Abuse and Academic Outcomes in Nigeria’s Post-Conflict Zones,” *Nigerian Journal of Social and Educational Research* 8, no. 2 (2023): 44–59.

¹² Interview with Rose Nwachukwu, NGO Coordinator, Age 41, Maiduguri, November 2025.

¹³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Humanitarian Response Plan for Nigeria 2024*, Geneva: UNHCR, 2024.

¹⁴ Interview with Modu Ibrahim, Carpenter, Age 47, Gongulong, November 2025.



cost of reconstruction and materials.¹⁵ The consequence is that even communities willing to return face economic barriers that prevent meaningful rebuilding.

Community-Led Financial Initiatives:

Despite these constraints, some communities have initiated local cooperative schemes to mobilize resources for reconstruction. Informal savings groups, community associations, and faith-based organizations have played a modest but significant role in helping families purchase materials and rebuild homes incrementally.

Imam Abba Yusuf 49 years old, a religious leader in Dusuman interviewed in November 2025, highlighted this approach: *"We encourage our people to contribute little by little. Even if we build one house at a time, it is progress (SIC)."*¹⁶

Such community-driven financial mechanisms demonstrate resilience and collective agency, aligning with Garba who emphasized the importance of grassroots resource mobilization in post-conflict rebuilding.¹⁷

Insecurity Effect on Relocation of IDPS to Their Original Settlement

Insecurity remains one of the most significant barriers to the relocation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from host communities in Jere Local Government Area back to their original settlements. Despite improvements in military operations across Borno State, sporadic attacks, banditry, and fears of insurgent resurgence continue to discourage voluntary return. The enduring threat of violence has not only hindered physical relocation but also

affected the psychological readiness of IDPs to reintegrate into former communities.

Interviews conducted in November 2025 revealed that many displaced persons still perceive their ancestral lands as unsafe. These fears are reinforced by stories of attacks in neighboring areas, unexploded ordnance, and the absence of sustainable security infrastructure such as military posts and local vigilante support.

Lingering Fear of Insurgency: Although the Nigerian military has reclaimed much of Borno State from insurgent control, residents in Jere report that occasional ambushes and night raids still occur in remote villages. This reality has made many IDPs reluctant to return permanently.

Mr. Abubakar Adamu 45 years old, a displaced farmer from Gongulong interviewed in November 2025, laments: *"We hear that Boko Haram still come around at night in some areas. Even if they don't attack, just the fear makes people stay here in Jere (SIC)."*¹⁸

The persistent threat of insurgent activity fosters psychological insecurity, which continues to shape displacement behaviour. As Ibrahim argued, fear-based displacement often endures long after physical security has been restored.¹⁹

Absence of Adequate Military Presence:

A recurring concern among respondents was the uneven deployment of security forces across resettled communities. While some central locations such as Dusuman and Maimusari have visible security patrols, peripheral areas like Bale Galtimari and Ngwom remain vulnerable.

¹⁵ National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Consumer Price Index Report, Abuja: NBS, 2025.

¹⁶ Interview with Imam Abba Yusuf, Cleric, Age 49, Dusuman, November 2025.

¹⁷ Garba, A. "Community Resilience and Resource Mobilization after Conflict," West African Review of Peacebuilding 9, no. 2 (2022): 63–78.

¹⁸ Interview with Abubakar Adamu, Farmer, Age 45, Gongulong, November 2025.

¹⁹ Ibrahim, A. "Fear and Displacement in Post-Conflict Northern Nigeria," African Studies Review 12, no. 1 (2023): 33–47.



Mrs. Hauwa Ibrahim 39 years old, a teacher from Bale Galtimari interviewed in November 2025, explains: *“They said we can go back, but who will protect us there? Soldiers only stay in the big places. In small villages, there is nobody to call if something happens.”*²⁰

This statement underscores the geographical disparity in protection, which has left some communities in Jere isolated from state security systems. According to Aminu, a stable and permanent security presence is essential to encourage voluntary return in post-conflict contexts.²¹

Threat of Banditry and Criminal Activities: Even in areas cleared of insurgents, banditry, theft, and extortion have emerged as new threats. The breakdown of law enforcement and loss of traditional authority structures have enabled local criminality to flourish.

Mr. Isa Sule 33 years old, a commercial driver interviewed in November 2025, believes that: *“People fear not just Boko Haram but also thieves. When we travel to carry goods near our villages, some boys stop us and collect money.”*²²

This aligns with Balogun who found that localized insecurity often persists after insurgencies, especially when youth unemployment and lack of policing remain unaddressed.²³ The continued prevalence of small-scale violence thus discourages

displaced families from resettling in their original communities.

Destruction of Social and Traditional Security Networks: Prior to the insurgency, communities in Jere relied on traditional vigilance systems including hunters’ groups and local guards to maintain order. However, displacement fractured these networks. Many traditional leaders were killed, displaced, or stripped of influence, resulting in the collapse of local governance structures.

Alhaji Mustapha Bukar 58 years old, a traditional leader from Mashamari interviewed in November 2025, that: *“Before, everyone knew who to call when there was danger. Now those leaders are gone or too old. There is no system again.”*²⁴

This social vacuum has contributed to widespread vulnerability and mistrust. Edeh noted that the absence of trusted community leadership exacerbates fear and delays the return process among displaced populations.²⁵

Gendered Impact of Insecurity on Women and Children: Female respondents expressed particular fear regarding gender-based violence (GBV) and the safety of children during potential relocation. Reports of harassment, abduction, and assault in isolated settlements have intensified these concerns.

Mrs. Hadiza Yusuf 34 years old, a displaced mother of three interviewed in November 2025, in her words: *“Even if we go back, what if our girls are not safe? Here in Jere*

²⁰ Interview with Hauwa Ibrahim, Teacher, Age 39, Bale Galtimari, November 2025.

²¹ Aminu, A. “Security and Reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria,” *Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution* 9, no. 2 (2025): 40–55.

²² Interview with Isa Sule, Driver, Age 33, Maiduguri, November 2025.

²³ Balogun, F. “Local Insecurity and Post-Insurgency Recovery in Borno State,” *Conflict and Society Journal* 11, no. 4 (2024): 14–29.

²⁴ Interview with Mustapha Bukar, Traditional Leader, Age 58, Mashamari, November 2025

²⁵ Edeh, J. “Community Leadership and Displacement Governance in Nigeria,” *Journal of African Peace Studies* 6, no. 3 (2021): 60–72.



at least we have neighbours and schools nearby.(SIC) ²⁶

Gender-specific vulnerabilities complicate the decision to return, as many families weigh security and social protection over ancestral ties. Chika observed that the protection of women and children remains a core determinant of durable solutions for displacement in Nigeria's northeast. ²⁷

Mistrust Between Returnees and Security Forces: While the military's role in securing territories is vital, interviews revealed instances of strained relations between returnees and security personnel. Some IDPs reported harassment at checkpoints or perceived discrimination in aid distribution, which has undermined trust.

Mr. Hassan Idris 41 years old, an IDP returnee interviewed in November 2025, states: *"Sometimes soldiers treat us as if we are suspects, not victims. This makes some people fear to go back to the villages where the military is in control.*(SIC) ²⁸

Such dynamics mirror Kennedy who found that a lack of community trust in security institutions prolongs displacement and delays reintegration. ²⁹ Building mutual confidence through inclusive community-security dialogues could therefore facilitate safer returns.

Psychological Trauma and Perceived Insecurity: Even when physical security improves, the psychological impact of prolonged conflict lingers among displaced

persons. Many IDPs interviewed displayed signs of anxiety, hyper-vigilance, and fear associated with their previous experiences of violence.

Mrs. Zainab Ahmed 36 years old, a displaced woman interviewed in November 2025, reveals: *"Every loud sound reminds me of gunshots. How can we go back when our minds are not healed yet?"* ³⁰

This aligns with Emmanuel, who argued that trauma recovery must precede physical relocation, as mental insecurity can prevent sustainable reintegration even in secure environments. ³¹

Weak Coordination Among Security Agencies: Respondents also cited poor coordination between military, police, and local vigilante groups as a major concern. In several instances, overlapping mandates and inconsistent communication have left security gaps.

Mr. Patrick Daniel 47 years old, a civil defense officer interviewed in November 2025, noted: *"We sometimes don't get updates on military patrol schedules. If everyone works separately, there will always be loopholes."* ³²

Effective coordination among security actors is thus vital to sustain peace and confidence in resettled areas. Mark emphasized that inter-agency synergy is a precondition for long-term stabilization in post-conflict regions. ³³

²⁶ Interview with Hadiza Yusuf, Trader, Age 34, Jere Camp, November 2025.

²⁷ Chika, O. "Gendered Dimensions of Displacement and Reintegration in Northeast Nigeria," *African Journal of Gender and Development* 8, no. 2 (2024): 19–35.

²⁸ Interview with Hassan Idris, Returnee, Age 41, Jere, November 2025

²⁹ Kennedy, P. "Civil-Military Relations and Humanitarian Response in Nigeria's North-East," *Peace and Security Review* 10, no. 2 (2021): 56–70.

³⁰ Interview with Zainab Ahmed, IDP, Age 36, Jere, November 2025.

³¹ Emmanuel, C. "Psychological Trauma and the Challenges of Resettlement in Post-Conflict Nigeria," *Journal of Development and Rehabilitation Studies* 7, no. 1 (2022): 41–55.

³² Interview with Patrick Daniel, Civil Defense Officer, Age 47, Maiduguri, November 2025.

³³ Mark, T. "Institutional Coordination and Stability in Post-Conflict Communities," *West African Journal of Strategic Studies* 9, no. 1 (2024): 70–84.



Unemployment Among IDPS and Relocation to Their Original Settlement

Unemployment remains a central factor discouraging the relocation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their original settlements in Jere Local Government Area, Borno State. While safety and shelter are immediate priorities, the absence of sustainable livelihood opportunities has emerged as a structural barrier preventing IDPs from re-establishing stable lives in their ancestral communities.

Most displaced individuals lost their farmlands, livestock, and small-scale businesses during the insurgency. In host communities such as Muna, Dusuman, and Mashamari, they rely largely on informal labour or humanitarian aid. The transition from aid dependency to self-reliance remains difficult without viable employment prospects in their home settlements.

Loss of Economic Livelihoods: Many IDPs expressed that returning to their original settlements would only deepen their hardship due to the collapse of rural economies. Farming, fishing, and petty trading once the main sources of livelihood have been disrupted by insecurity, poor soil conditions, and loss of agricultural tools.

Mr. Ibrahim Musa (42), a displaced farmer from Ngwom interviewed in November 2025, states: *"We used to live by farming, but our farmlands are gone. Even if I go back, I have no tools or seeds to start again."*(SIC)³⁴

According to Lawrence, the destruction of economic assets during displacement leads to prolonged dependency on humanitarian assistance and delays reintegration.³⁵

³⁴ Interview with Ibrahim Musa, Farmer, Age 42, Ngwom, November 2025.

³⁵ Lawrence, T. "Economic Recovery and Post-Displacement Reintegration in Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Migration and Development Studies* 10, no. 2 (2022): 22–35.

Limited Employment Opportunities in Resettled Areas: Even in communities considered safe, job creation remains minimal. The absence of small industries, local markets, and reconstruction projects means that returning IDPs face economic stagnation. Most rely on seasonal labour, which is neither consistent nor sufficient to sustain families.

Mrs. Halima Gana 36 years old, a widow interviewed in November 2025, explains: *"If I go back to my village, who will employ me? Here in Jere, I can wash clothes for people and get small money to feed my children"*(SIC).³⁶

This sentiment aligns with Okon, who argued that post-conflict reconstruction efforts must integrate livelihood programs alongside security operations to ensure durable returns.³⁷

Dependency on Humanitarian Aid: The longer IDPs remain in camps or host communities, the more dependent they become on humanitarian assistance. While such aid ensures survival, it inadvertently discourages relocation since most original settlements lack organized relief structures.

Mr. Suleiman Umar 40 years old, an IDP camp volunteer interviewed in November 2025, says: *"In the camp, at least we get food once in a while. But if we go home, there is nothing no food, no work, nothing."*³⁸

This dependency phenomenon has been widely documented. Maryam noted that aid dependency can psychologically and economically entrench displacement,

³⁶ . Interview with Halima Gana, Widow, Age 36, Jere Camp, November 2025.

³⁷ Okon, J. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Livelihood Restoration in Northeast Nigeria," *African Journal of Social Policy* 12, no. 1 (2023): 45–59.

³⁸ Interview with Suleiman Umar, Camp Volunteer, Age 40, Muna, November 2025.



particularly when job opportunities are absent in return areas.³⁹

Youth Unemployment and Social Instability: Young people represent the majority of IDPs in Jere, and their unemployment poses serious social and security challenges. Idle youth often engage in casual labour, street hawking, or petty crime to survive. The lack of vocational training or access to credit discourages them from returning to rural settlements, where economic opportunities are even scarcer.

Mr. Abdulrahman Usman 28 years old, a displaced youth interviewed in November 2025, notes: *"We young men can't just sit without work. If we go back and there's nothing to do, we'll suffer more than here (SIC)."*⁴⁰

According to Daniel, youth unemployment in post-conflict contexts not only hinders resettlement but also increases the risk of re-recruitment into armed groups.⁴¹

Women's Economic Vulnerabilities: Women, especially widows and single mothers, face disproportionate barriers in accessing economic resources. Many have limited education, lack collateral for credit, and depend on humanitarian handouts. Returning to remote villages without stable livelihoods exposes them to poverty and exploitation.

Mrs. Rukaiya Mohammed 31 years old, a tailor interviewed in November 2025, states: *"Here, I sew clothes for other women and*

*get small income. If I go home, there is no market for sewing or customers (SIC)."*⁴²

Chika highlighted that livelihood empowerment for displaced women is crucial for sustainable reintegration, as female-headed households form a large portion of IDP populations.⁴³

Lack of Government Economic Support Programs: Respondents consistently reported that government job creation and empowerment schemes have not adequately reached displaced populations. Many IDPs in Jere expressed frustration that economic recovery programs are urban-centered, leaving rural returnees without assistance.

Mr. Auwal Mohammed 47 years old, a local community leader interviewed in November 2025, emphasizes: *"The government talks about youth empowerment, but we don't see it here. IDPs need loans, tools, and training before going home."*⁴⁴

This aligns with Femi, who argued that economic reintegration policies must prioritize displaced groups to prevent cyclical displacement.⁴⁵

Private Sector Absence in Post-Conflict Recovery: The private sector, which could play a key role in job creation, remains largely absent from return zones in Jere. Businesses face infrastructural challenges, insecurity, and low purchasing power, making investment unattractive. Consequently, IDPs lack both employment

³⁹ Maryam, A. "Aid Dependency and the Dynamics of Displacement in Borno State," *Journal of Humanitarian Affairs* 8, no. 4 (2025): 33–48.

⁴⁰ Interview with Abdulrahman Usman, Youth, Age 28, Jere, November 2025.

⁴¹ Daniel, P. "Youth Unemployment and Post-Insurgency Reintegration in Northern Nigeria," *Conflict Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2023): 66–80.

⁴² Interview with Rukaiya Mohammed, Tailor, Age 31, Jere, November 2025.

⁴³ Chika, O. "Gendered Dimensions of Displacement and Reintegration in Northeast Nigeria," *African Journal of Gender and Development* 8, no. 2 (2024): 19–35.

⁴⁴ Interview with Auwal Mohammed, Community Leader, Age 47, Mashamari, November 2025.

⁴⁵ Femi, L. "Economic Reintegration and Durable Solutions for IDPs in Nigeria," *Journal of Policy and Development Studies* 11, no. 1 (2022): 52–68.



and entrepreneurial opportunities upon return.

Mr. Peter Ede 38 years old, a small trader interviewed in November 2025, remarks: *“No one wants to open shop in our village because there is no light, no road, no customers. How will people survive there?”*⁴⁶

According to Balogun, rebuilding private enterprise in post-conflict regions requires simultaneous investment in infrastructure, access to markets, and credit facilities.⁴⁷

Migration and Urban Drift: Some IDPs, particularly younger adults, prefer to remain in or near urban centers like Maiduguri, where informal economic activities are concentrated. The prospect of better income outweighs the emotional desire to return home. This rural-to-urban drift further depopulates original settlements and complicates recovery planning.

Miss Fatima Ibrahim 24 years old, a student interviewed in November 2025, shared with the researcher that: *“I don’t want to go back to the village because there are no schools or jobs. I’d rather stay here and find small business.”*⁴⁸

Olumide observed that economic migration among displaced youth represents a pragmatic survival strategy rather than a rejection of ancestral identity.⁴⁹

Skills Gap and Lack of Vocational Training: Another recurring theme was the lack of skills development opportunities for

displaced persons. Many IDPs have limited formal education and depend on unskilled labor. Without vocational programs, their employability in resettled areas remains extremely low.

Mr. Musa Garba 30 years old, a displaced artisan interviewed in November 2025, complains: *“We need training. If I learn welding or carpentry, I can work anywhere. But nobody is training us.”*⁵⁰ Isaac stressed that skills acquisition is central to rebuilding human capital and supporting durable solutions for displacement.⁵¹

Conclusion

The study established that although government and humanitarian agencies have implemented various resettlement initiatives, these efforts have been constrained by inadequate funding, limited infrastructure, weak livelihood support, and insufficient security in many return communities. In addition, the continued dependence of many IDPs on humanitarian assistance, coupled with the psychological trauma associated with prolonged displacement and conflict, has reduced their willingness to return to their places of origin. The study concludes that sustainable relocation of IDPs in Jere Local Government Area requires a comprehensive and integrated approach that goes beyond physical resettlement. Effective resettlement policies should prioritize improved security, economic empowerment through employment and livelihood opportunities, adequate financial support for reconstruction, psychosocial support services, and the restoration of essential social infrastructure. Addressing these

⁴⁶ Interview with Peter Ede, Trader, Age 38, Jere Market, November 2025.

⁴⁷ Balogun, F. “Local Insecurity and Post-Insurgency Recovery in Borno State,” *Conflict and Society Journal* 11, no. 4 (2024): 14–29.

⁴⁸ Interview with Fatima Ibrahim, Student, Age 24, Jere, November 2025.

⁴⁹ Olumide, K. “Urban Drift and Economic Adaptation among Displaced Youth,” *West African Journal of Development Studies* 10, no. 3 (2024): 27–42.

⁵⁰ Interview with Musa Garba, Artisan, Age 30, Jere, November 2025.

⁵¹ Isaac, J. “Skills Development and Human Capital Restoration in Post-Conflict Nigeria,” *African Economic Review* 9, no. 2 (2024): 36–51.



interrelated determinants will not only encourage voluntary return but also promote long-term reintegration, community resilience, and sustainable peace in the post-conflict communities of Jere Local Government Area.

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